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East	Malaysia	in	Malaysian	Development	Planning	
David	Lim	
I.	Introduction	
Malaysia	consists	of	Peninsular	Malaysia	and	the	two	East	Malaysian	states	of	Sabah	and	
Sarawak.	Development	planning	in	Peninsular	Malaysia	began	as	early	as	1950,	while	the	
first	plan	for	the	whole	of	the	Malaysian	federation	founded	in	I963	was	published	in	1966.	
Have	the	two	East	Malaysian	states	been	integrated	properly	into	the	various	Malaysian	
plans?	Or	have	they.	with	their	somewhat	different	economic.	political	and	social	
backgrounds,	been	treated	as	a	nuisance	element	and	appeared	in	the	plans	only	as	an	
afterthought?	In	any	case.	is	the	planning	experience	of	Peninsular	Malaysia	relevant	for	
solving	the	problems	of	the	much	less	developed	East	Malaysian	states?	
Section	II	gives	a	brief	history	of	planning	in	Malaysia,	and	Section	III	an	evaluation	of	it.	
Section	IV	argues	the	case	for	adopting	planning	in	East	Malaysia,	and	the	relevance	of	the	
planning	experience	of	Peninsular	Malaysia	for	East	Malaysian	economic	development,	in	
spite	of	social	and	economic	differences	between	the	two.	Section	V	argues	that	the	style	of	
planning	adopted	in	Sabah	and	Sarawak	before	they	became	part	of	Malaysia	in	1963	is	
quite	consistent	with	that	adopted	in	Peninsular	Malaysia,	thereby	further	showing	the	
relevance	of	the	one	for	the	other.	Section	VI	contains	some	concluding	thoughts	on	the	
future	of	planning	in	East	Malaysia.	
II.	Malaysian	Planning:	History	
Four	five-year	Malaysian	development	plans	have	been	published	since	the	formation	of	the	
Malaysian	federation	in	1963.	Before	that	there	were	separate	plans	for	Malaya,	Sabah	and	
Sarawak.	The	First	Malaysia	Plan,	1966-70,	was	the	first	integrated	plan	for	the	three	
regions.	It	was	also	the	first	of	a	twenty-year	Perspective	Plan	and	presented	the	short—run	
measures	of	the	government	to	solve	the	economic	and	social	problems	of	the	country	
within	a	broad	and	long-run	strategy	of	economic	development.1	The	fundamental	aim	of	
the	Perspective	Plan	was	the	creation	of	an	environment	in	which	all	the	various	ethnic	
groups	could	live	in	dignity	and	harmony.	This	was	to	be	achieved	through	a	faster	rate	of	
economic	growth.	the	creation	of	greater	employment	opportunities,	and	a	reduction	in	the	
relative	economic	imbalance	in	the	distribution	of	income	and	wealth.	Economic	
diversification,	infrastructural	development,	manpower	training	and	other	programmes	
were	simply	operational	devices	to	bring	about	the	basic	aim.	The	private	sector	was	to	play	
the	leading	role.	
The	Second	Malaysia	Plan,	1971-75,	saw	the	introduction	of	the	New	Economic	Policy	with	
its	twin	objectives	of	poverty	eradication	and	the	economic	restructuring	of	the	country.2	
The	New	Economic	Policy	was	the	government’s	dramatic	response	to	the	racial	
disturbances	of	May	1969.	which	it	saw	as	the	result	of	the	unequal	distribution	of	the	
benefits	of	economic	growth.	The	poverty	eradication	programme	sees	increasing	the	
access	of	the	poor	to	land.	capital.	training,	and	other	public	amenities	as	the	most	effective	
way	of	reducing	the	incidence	of	absolute	poverty.	
The	restructuring	programme	aims	at	reducing	the	dependence	of	the	Malays	and	other	
indigenous	people	on	subsistence	agriculture	and	increasing	their	role	in	the	modern	rural	
and	urban	sectors	of	the	economy.	It	has	two	explicit	quota-goals.	The	first	is	that	
employment	by	sector	should	approximate	the	racial	composition	of	the	population:	54	per	
cent	Malay	and	other	indigenous	people,	35	per	cent	Chinese.	10	per	cent	Indians.	and	l	per	
cent	others.	The	second	is	that	by	1990	the	Malays	and	other	indigenous	people	should	own	
and	manage	at	least	30	per	cent	of	the	capital	of	the	corporate	sector,	as	compared	to	the	
2.4	per	cent	share	in	1970.	These	are	to	be	brought	about	by	a	growth	and	not	a	
redistributive	strategy.	This	means	that	the	increase	in	the	Malay	share	of	corporate	capital	
is	to	come	about	by	the	active	involvement	of	Malays	in	an	expanding	output.	not	by	the	
redistribution	of	the	existing	output.	The	same	marginal	approach	is	envisaged	for	the	
employment	restructuring	programme.	
The	Third	Malaysia	Plan,	1976-80.	is	the	second	of	four	five-year	plans	designed	to	
implement	the	objectives	of	the	New	Economic	Policy.	The	strategy	adopted	is	the	same	as	
that	of	the	previous	plan.	which	is	to	reduce	the	incidence	of	poverty	and	to	restructure	
society	through	a	growth	rather	than	a	redistributive	strategy.	The	main	source	of	economic	
growth	was	expected	to	come	from	the	private	sector,	with	exports	and	private	investment	
playing	the	dominant	role.3	This	was	in	contrast	to	the	position	in	the	Second	Malaysia	Plan,	
where	public	consumption	and	investment	were	the	principal	sources	of	growth	in	output.	
The	Fourth	Malaysia	Plan,	1981-85,	continues	the	strategy	adopted	in	the	previous	two	
plans	in	implementing	the	New	Economic	Policy.	The	private	sector	is	expected	to	provide	
the	bulk	of	the	increase	in	output	and	employment	required	for	the	restructuring	
programme.4	The	main	emphasis	of	the	public	investment	expenditure	programme	is	to	
consolidate	past	and	existing	development	projects,	in	order	to	increase	the	overall	
effectiveness	of	the	public	sector	programme.	
III.	Malaysian	Planning:	Evaluation5	
The	planning	model	adopted	by	the	four	Malaysian	plans	is	the	aggregate	Harrod-	Domar	
one.	This	basically	assumes	that	the	crucial	constraint	to	economic	growth	is	the	shortage	of	
capital.	The	growth	of	such	an	economy,	ignoring	population	growth.	is	given	by	g	=	s/k,	
where	g	is	the	growth	rate	of	output,	s	the	rate	of	saving	and	k	the	incremental	capital-
output	ratio.6	The	four	Malaysian	plans	thus	continue	the	format	that	was	first	used	by	the	
Second	Malaya	Plan,	1961-65.7	Typically	the	plan	document	begins	with	a	review	of	the	
progress	made	by	the	previous	one.	This	is	then	followed	by	an	analysis	of	the	prevailing	
problems	of	the	country	and	a	statement	of	the	objectives	of	the	current	plan.	The	sectoral	
programme	for	fulfilling	these	objectives	by	both	the	private	and	the	public	sectors	are	
presented.	The	financial	resources	required	are	then	estimated	and	the	possible	sources	of	
funds	examined.	Attempts	at	ensuring	sectoral	balances	are	made.	though	not	necessarily	in	
any	sophisticated	input-output	way.	Thus,	as	far	as	the	presentation	and	the	technique	are	
concerned,	the	Malaysia	plans	and	the	Second	Malaya	Plan	are	superior	to	their	
predecessors	in	Peninsular	Malaya	and	in	Sabah	and	Sarawak.	The	use	of	the	Harrod-Domar	
model	gives	direction	to	the	development	effort,	firstly,	in	identifying	overall	objectives	and,	
secondly,	in	presenting	some	of	these	in	numerical	form.	It	also	provides	a	more	objective	
basis	for	the	allocation	of	public	development	expenditure	between	the	various	government	
departments,	thereby	avoiding	the	scramble	for	funds	under	the	previous	system.	The	role	
of	the	private	sector	can	also	be	better	assessed	and	the	fiscal	policies	required	to	
encourage	this	role	more	easily	worked	out.	
The	plans	have	also	been	successful	in	achieving	the	targets	for	the	growth	of	the	real	GDP.	
Thus	while	the	First	Malaysia	Plan.	1966-70,	planned	for	a	4.9	per	cent	annual	growth	rate	
for	the	real	GDP,	the	rate	achieved	was	about	6.0	per	cent.	For	the	Second	Malaysia	Plan.	
1971-75.	the	annual	growth	rate	of	7.4	per	cent	exceeded	the	original	target	rate	of	6.8	per	
cent,	while	for	the	Third	Malaysia	Plan,	1976-80,	the	actual	growth	rate	also	exceeded	the	
targetted	one.	though	by	a	smaller	margin	(8.6	per	cent	compared	to	8.4	per	cent	per	year).	
The	employment	target	set	for	the	1966-70	plan	was.	however,	not	achieved.	For	Peninsular	
Malaysia	the	rate	of	open	unemployment	rose	from	6.0	per	cent	in	1965	to	8.0	per	cent	in	
1970.	The	plan	had	anticipated	a	decline	to	5.2	per	cent.	For	Malaysia	as	a	whole	the	rate	of	
unemployment	increased	from	6.0	per	cent	to	7.3	per	cent,	showing	that	the	rate	of	
unemployment	had	also	increased	in	East	Malaysia	but	that	the	shortfall	there	was	not	as	
marked	as	that	in	Peninsular	Malaysia.	A	related	failure	of	the	First	Malaysia	Plan	was	the	
inability	to	arrest	the	worsening	inequality	in	income	distribution.	There	are	no	reliable	
statistical	data	to	substantiate	this	claim.	but	the	Second	Malaysia	Plan	did	admit	that	the	
income	gap	between	the	rich	and	the	poor	had	widened	over	the	period	1966-70.	
From	1970	onward	Malaysian	planning	has	been	consumed	with	the	implementation	of	the	
New	Economic	Policy.	In	the	process	direct	and	indirect	government	intervention	in	the	
economy	has	risen	to	a	level	which	has	begun	to	adversely	affect	the	running	of	the	
economy.	The	incidence	of	poverty	has	undoubtedly	been	reduced	by	continuing	the	
traditional	programme	in	the	rural	sector.	The	same	programmes	have	also	increased	
income	inequality,	even	for	the	Malay	community,	the	target	group	of	the	New	Economic	
Policy.	This	process	has	been	helped,	in	no	small	measure,	by	the	approach	taken	by	the	
government	in	implementing	the	New	Economic	Policy.	
In	1970	49.3	per	cent	of	all	households	in	Peninsular	Malaysia	lived	below	the	poverty	line.	
By	1983	the	incidence	of	poverty	had	declined	to	30.3	per	cent.	In	the	agricultural	sector	the	
decline	was	from	63	to	55	per	cent	and	in	the	urban	sector	from	19	to	11	per	cent.	In	Sabah	
the	incidence	of	poverty	in	the	urban	areas	went	down	from	26	to	16	per	cent	over	the	
period	1976-82,	while	in	the	rural	areas	the	decline	was	from	66	to	36	per	cent.	In	Sarawak	
the	decrease	in	the	urban	sector	was	from	23	to	9	per	cent,	while	in	the	rural	sector	it	was	
from	64	to	39	per	cent.8	
The	Malaysian	government	has	guardedly	concluded	that	income	distribution	has	become	
slightly	more	even	since	the	inception	of	the	New	Economic	Policy,	as	the	Gini	coefficient	
has	decreased	from	0.513	to	0.508	over	the	period	1970-79.9	However.	other	data	
published	in	the	Fourth	Malaysia	Plan	and	the	Mid-term	Review	of	the	Fourth	Malaysia	Plan	
show	that	even	this	guarded	conclusion	is	not	warranted,	and	that,	in	fact,	there	has	not	
been	a	consistent	movement	towards	income	equality	in	Peninsular	Malaysia	since	1970.	
Data	on	the	mean	and	the	median	real	monthly	household	incomes	were	provided	
separately	for	Peninsular	Malaysia	for	the	period	1970-79.	An	increase	in	the	ratio	of	the	
mean	to	the	median	monthly	household	incomes	would	signify	an	increase	in	income	
inequality.	Table	1	shows	that	such	an	increase	was	evident	for	Peninsular	Malaysia	as	a	
whole,	and	for	the	urban,	rural,	Malay,	and	Chinese	populations	for	the	period	1970-76.	
Over	the	more	recent	period.	1976-79,	the	ratios	for	Peninsular	Malaysia	and	its	urban	areas	
fell	but	only	to	their	1970	levels.	The	ratio	for	the	rural	areas	remained	the	same.	That	for	
the	Chinese	fell	but	to	a	level	that	was	higher	than	its	1970	level.	while	for	the	Malays	the	
ratio	increased.	showing	a	consistent	increase	in	income	inequality	over	the	entire	period	of	
1970-79.	Thus	while	the	incidence	of	poverty	has	been	reduced	this	was	accompanied	by	an	
increase	in	income	inequality	in	most	sections	of	the	population	in	Peninsular	Malaysia.	It	
has	not	been	a	case	of	the	“rich	getting	richer	and	the	poor	poorer",	but	rather	one	of	the	
“poor	getting	less	poor.	and	the	richer	much	richer".	The	result	has,	therefore.	not	been	
altogether	bad	but	must	have,	nevertheless.	been	disappointing	for	a	government	so	bound	
up	with	“growth	with	equity”	issues.	Income	distribution	data	were	not	available	for	East	
Malaysia	but	it	would	be	surprising	if	there	had	not	been	the	same	movement	toward	
increasing	income	inequality	since	the	same	development	strategy	was	pursued	and	the	
presence	of	factors	which	might	have	reversed	or	slowed	the	movement	toward	inequality	
was	even	less	evident.	
	
Another	criticism	that	can	be	made	of	the	New	Economic	Policy	is	that	its	explicit	quota-
goals	have	been	too	ambitious,	and	that	the	measures	that	have	been	taken	to	achieve	
them	have	impeded	the	growth	process.	upon	which	the	fulfilment	of	the	New	Economic	
Policy	depends.	For	example,	the	target	share	of	the	corporate	stock	in	Peninsular	Malaysia	
for	the	Malays	and	other	indigenous	people	for	1975	was	14.4	per	cent.	The	actual	share	
obtained	was	only	7.8	per	cent.	The	low	income	of	the	Malays	and	the	correspondingly	low	
propensity	to	save	meant	that	many	of	the	shares	reserved	for	Malays	in	private	enterprises	
could	not	be	taken	up	by	Malay	individuals	and	firms.	In	order	to	achieve	the	target,	various	
statutory	bodies	(e.g.,	MARA.	PERNAS	and	the	Permodalan	Nasional	Berhad)	began	to	hold	
the	share	capital	in	trust	for	the	bumipurtra	population.	However,	even	with	the	
“bumipurtra	trust	agencies"	and	not	“bumipurtra	individuals"	spearheading	the	wealth	
restructuring	programme	of	the	New	Economic	Policy.	there	was	a	significant	shortfall	in	the	
programme.	
This	resulted	in	an	even	greater	dependence	on	the	statutory	bodies	to	hold	corporate	
shares	in	trust	for	the	Malays.	A	number	of	economically	adverse	consequences	followed	
from	this.	First	was	the	inefficiency	which	arose	from	the	concentration	of	power	under	
bureaucratic	control.	There	is	no	guarantee	that	state	enterprises	will	be	run	efficiently.	
Their	senior	managers	are	usually	politicians	or	civil	servants	on	secondment	who	may	not	
necessarily	make	good	businessmen,	or	owe	allegiance	to	the	statutory	bodies	they	head.	
Second,	the	very	rapid	concentration	of	economic	power	in	the	hands	of	a	small	group	of	
people	inevitably	increased	the	scope	for	“rent	seeking".10	Third,	the	greatly	increased	role	
of	the	state	in	the	economy	would	create	fear	and	uncertainty	in	the	private	sector	with	
adverse	effects	on	private	investment.	
If	private	investment	were	to	slow	down	and	there	is	gross	inefficiency	in	the	operation	of	
the	statutory	bodies.	the	growth	of	the	economy	and	the	corporate	sector	will	be	adversely	
affected.	This	will	then	require	a	higher	Malay	share	of	the	increase	in	the	stock	of	wealth,	
which	may	further	slow	down	the	rate	of	growth	in	the	corporate	stock.	Unless	the	
efficiency	of	the	statutory	bodies	is	increased	and/or	a	scaling	down	of	the	restructuring	
targets	is	accepted,	the	original	growth	strategy	on	which	the	New	Economic	Policy	is	built	
may	be	abandoned	in	favour	of	a	redistributive	one.	
These	criticisms	acquire	greater	significance	against	a	background	of	growing	in-	equality	in	
income	and	wealth	distribution	within	the	Malay	community.	The	majority	of	the	shares	
reserved	for	the	Malays	have	been	bought.	as	could	be	expected.	by	the	richer	members.	
The	purchase	of	shares	to	be	held	in	trust	for	the	poor	not	only	increases	the	power	of	the	
relatively	small	number	of	Malay	politicians	and	civil	servants	in	charge	but	also	boosts	their	
income	very	considerably.	This	growing	inequality	is	inevitable	in	the	short-run.	The	fear	is	
that	it	will	persist,	for	without	tight	supervision	the	trustees	of	the	assets	may	come	to	
administer	them	on	their	own	behalf	rather	than	on	behalf	of	the	intended	beneficiaries,	
the	Malay	poor.	
Most	of	these	weaknesses	of	Malaysian	planning	have	been	recognised	by	the	government	
in	the	Mid-term	Review	of	the	Fourth	Malaysia	Plan.	Concern	was	expressed	about	the	
shortfall	in	private	investment	and	the	rapid	increase	in	public	investment	(16.5	per	cent	
p.a.	against	a	planned	4.1	per	cent	p.a.).	The	government	saw	the	main	macro-	economic	
task	for	the	remainder	of	the	plan	period	as	the	reversal	of	this	trend.	a	move	that	began	
with	the	1984	budget's	cut-back	of	public	consumption.	The	review	also	saw	the	need	to	
revise	the	goals	of	the	New	Economic	Policy,	to	rely	more	on	“privatisation"	to	bring	about	
the	transfer	of	corporate	wealth,	and	to	ensure	that	a	wider	cross-section	of	the	bumiputra	
community	benefit	from	the	restructuring	programme.	There	was	also	concern	over	the	
dramatically	rising	debt	service	charges	(from	11	per	cent	of	government	revenue	in	the	
19705	to	one	of	25	per	cent	in	1984),	brought	about.	in	large	measure.	by	the	massive	
acquisition	of	foreign-owned	Malaysian	assets.	which	was	spurred	on,	in	turn.	by	the	
restructuring	programme	of	the	New	Economic	Policy.	The	Malaysianisation	of	assets	does	
not	necessarily	create	wealth	and	the	probable	economic	growth	forgone	and	the	certain	
outflow	of	funds	have	necessitated	a	slowing	down	of	the	programme.	
IV.	Need	for	Planning	in	East	Malaysia	and	the	Relevance	of	the	Peninsular	Malaysian	
Experience	
Malaysian	planning	is	influenced	very	heavily	by	the	Peninsular	Malaysian	experience.	This	is	
to	be	expected	for	a	number	of	reasons.	First.	the	personnel	responsible	for	formulating	the	
overall	strategy	for	development	are,	without	exception.	from	Peninsular	Malaysia.	Second.	
the	planning	skills	available	for	drafting	the	First	Malaysia	Plan,	in	the	sense	of	being	able	to	
produce	a	document	that	is	more	than	an	aggregation	of	the	expansion	programmes	of	
separate	government	departments,	were	derived	from	the	work	involved	in	drawing	up	the	
First	and	the	Second	Malaya	Plans.	Third,	Peninsular	Malaysia	is	very	much	more	important	
than	East	Malaysia:	in	1970	it	accounted	for	85	and	86	per	cent	of	the	Malaysian	population	
and	gross	domestic	product	respectively.	
Under	such	circumstances.	it	would	have	been	strange	if	the	strategies	adopted	for	the	four	
Malaysian	plans	have	not	been	influenced	significantly	by	the	development	experience	of	
Peninsular	Malaysia.	The	extent	to	which	this	experience	is	relevant	for	solving	the	
development	problems	of	East	Malaysia	depends	on	how	similar	their	economic	structures	
and	social	indicators	are.	Differences	in	these	would	show,	to	a	large	extent,	differences	in	
the	constraints	to	growth	and	differences	in	the	strategy	required	to	break	them.	It	also	
depends	on	the	development	planning	that	was	carried	out	in	Sabah	and	Sarawak	before	
they	became	part	of	Malaysia	in	1963.	If	this	was	substantially	different	from	the	Peninsular	
Malaysian	approach.	then	it	would	be	difficult	to	incorporate	the	one	into	the	other.	
The	industrial	origins	of	the	GDP	of	Malaysia.	Peninsular	Malaysia,	and	East	Malaysia	and	its	
constituent	pans	of	Sabah	and	Sarawak	for	‘I970	and	1983	are	given	in	Table	2.	It	can	be	
seen	that	the	agricultural,	forestry,	and	fishing	sector	is	much	more	important	for	East	
Malaysia,	especially	for	Sabah.	Mining	and	quarrying	activities	are	also	more	significant	to	
Sabah	and	Sarawak.	especially	the	latter.	On	the	other	hand.	manufacturing	plays	a	much	
less	important	role	in	East	Malaysia.	particularly	in	the	case	of	Sabah.	Equally	interesting	is	
the	fact	that	these	structural	differences	have	become	more	pronounced	over	the	years.	
What	these	differences	show	is	that	the	Peninsular	Malaysian	economy	is	much	less	
dependent	on	primary-producing	activities	and	much	more	dependent	on	secondary	ones	
than	the	East	Malaysian	economy.	This	is	confirmed	by	the	differences	in	the	occupational	
distribution	of	their	labour	force.	Table	3	shows	that	a	far	larger	proportion	of	East	
Malaysians	found	work	in	the	agricultural	sector,	while	the	reverse	is	true	as	far	as	
manufacturing	(which	takes	in	production	workers)	and	tertiary	activities	(which	take	in	
service	and	sales	personnel)	are	concerned.	These	differences	are	also	shown	by	the	much	
larger	role	played	by	the	agricultural	and	services	sectors,	and	the	much	smaller	role	played	
by	the	manufacturing	sector.	in	job-creation	in	East	Malaysia.	
	
	
		
Another	very	important	difference	between	East	and	Peninsular	Malaysia	is	in	the	social	
indicators	of	economic	development.	The	former	is	much	less	well-placed	in	the	provision	of	
infrastructural	facilities	(e.g.,	roads	and	railways),	education	(e.g.,	the	teacher-student	ratio	
and	the	upper	secondary/form	VI	transition	rate)	and	medical	services	(e.g.,	the	number	of	
persons	per	registered	doctor	or	per	acute	hospital	bed).	The	balance	in	favour	of	
Peninsular	Malaysia	is	equally	true	for	Sabah,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	in	197]	and	1983	the	
per	capita	GDP	of	Sabah	was	higher	than	the	average	for	Peninsular	Malaysia.	These	two	
sets	of	data	simply	show	the	very	strongly	dualistic	nature	of	the	Sabah	economy.	where	
there	is	a	small	but	highly	productive	modern	sector	of	oil.	timber	and	cash	crops.	co-
existing	with	a	larger.	low-productivity	subsistence	sector.	
Another	difference	between	East	and	Peninsular	Malaysia	lies	in	the	availability	of	land.	East	
Malaysia	has	over	60	per	cent	of	Malaysia's	total	area	and	about	50	per	cent	of	its	
developed	area	but	only	about	17	per	cent	of	its	population.	The	low	population	density	is	
especially	striking	for	Sarawak,	with	1.	1	million	people	on	30.7	million	acres	of	land	or	40	
per	cent	of	the	country’s	total	land	area.	Another	way	of	looking	at	the	disparity	is	to	note	
that	Sabah	alone	has	as	much	land	suitable	for	agriculture	and	still	available	for	
development	as	Peninsular	Malaysia,	while	Sarawak	has	two	and	a	half	times	as	much.	The	
“undeveloped”	state	of	the	East	Malaysian	economy	has	also	probably	meant	that	mineral	
exploration	inside	it	has	only	begun,	although	the	offshore	oil-fields	in	Malaysia	are	located	
in	East	Malaysian	waters.	
The	analysis	so	far	shows	that	East	Malaysia	is	very	significantly	more	dependent	than	
Peninsular	Malaysia	on	primary	production.	This	will	remain	so	for	some	time	to	come	
because	of	the	great	abundance	of	untapped	cultivable	land	there.	East	Malaysia	lags	very	
considerably	behind	in	its	infrastructure.	manpower	development.	and	medical	facilities.	
The	population	density	is	also	very	much	lower.	Perhaps	symptomatic	of	the	relatively	
“undeveloped”	state	of	the	East	Malaysian	economy	is	the	severe	shortage	of	statistical	
data.	
These	social	and	economic	characteristics	of	East	Malaysia	suggest	that	the	development	
planning	required	is	essentially	one	of	producing	an	efficient	land-use	programme,	of	
ensuring	that	the	development	of	natural	resources	is	not	carried	out	haphazardly.	with	
scant	regard	for	the	rate	of	depletion	and	market	demand.	This	does	not	make	development	
planning	any	less	necessary	or	easy.	A	natural	resource	development	programme	will	
require	a	detailed	topographical	study	of	the	country	to	find	out	what	crops	and	minerals	
can	be	produced,	an	equally	detailed	study	of	the	market	demand	for	these	products	to	
ensure	that	what	are	produced	will	be	sold	profitably,	an	examination	of	the	various	
strategies	of,	say,	land	development	for	the	cultivation	of	various	cash-crops	once	these	
have	been	decided.	and	the	choice	of	production	methods	within	each	sector.	It	would	also	
require	programmes	to	develop	the	supporting	infrastructural	facilities	and	manpower	
resources.	
The	need	for	topographical	and	market	demand	analyses	are	self-evident	and	they	require	
analytical	skills	of	a	very	high	order.	Land	development	strategies	have	to	be	examined	to	
find	out	whether	the	early	small-scale	Felda	(Federal	Land	Development	Authority)	format	is	
more	suitable	than	its	more	recent	integrated	rural	development	one.	This	exercise	requires	
agricultural,	technical,	economic,	and	sociological	skills	separately	and	in	conjunction	with	
one	another.	The	integrated	approach	would	provide	economies	of	scale	and	externalities	
but	would	cost	a	great	deal	more	and	require	a	much	greater	range	of	skills.	The	choice	of	
production	methods	is	also	important	as	there	are,	for	example,	different	ways	of	clearing	
the	land	and	of	building	the	road-system	and	houses	within	a	land	development	scheme	and	
these	will	have	quite	different	impacts	on	efficiency,	employment	and	equity.	At	the	same	
time	the	supporting	infrastructure	and	manpower	resources	must	be	developed.	
A	development	strategy	that	is	based	on	the	development	of	natural	resources	and	the	
accompanying	infrastructural	and	manpower	services	is	therefore	not	a	“hit	and	miss”	
affair.	Nor	is	it	one	that	requires	no	development	planning	in	the	normally	accepted	sense.	
Thus	a	most	needed	macroeconomic	framework	for	estimating	the	savings	and	foreign	
exchange	required	for	the	natural	resource	and	infrastructural	development	programmes	
can	be	provided	by	the	open	Harrod-Domar	model.	The	sectoral	approach	can	then	be	
integrated	into	this	broad	framework	to	ensure	that	the	activities	of	the	various	sectors	are	
co-ordinated.	There	is.	however.	little	need	for	the	sophisticated	inter-	industry	
programming	approach	with	its	severe	data	requirement.	If	an	input-output	table	is	at	all	
needed.	it	has	only	to	be	in	the	most	rudimentary	form.	Econometric	modelling	is	also	a	
luxury.	On	the	other	hand.	it	is	important	to	have	skills	in	social	cost-	benefit	analysis.	
There	are	thus	important	differences	between	East	and	Peninsular	Malaysia.	How-	ever.	
Malaysian	planning,	though	influenced	very	heavily	by	the	Peninsular	Malaysian	experience.	
is	relevant	for	East	Malaysia.	It	is	true	that	in	1984,	Peninsular	Malaysia	is	much	less	
dependent	on	the	primary	sector	than	Sabah	and	Sarawak	and	that	it	is	many	years	ahead	in	
most	areas	of	social	and	economic	development.	However,	it	is	equally	true	that	until	only	
very	recently	Peninsular	Malaysian	economic	growth	was	based	on	primary	production	and	
that	even	in	1984	the	primary	sector	is	only	slightly	less	important	than	the	manufacturing	
sector.	Thus	Peninsular	Malaysian	planning	was.	and	continues	to	be,	significantly	
concerned	about	primary	production.	As	such	the	experience	of	the	last	25	years	and	the	
knowledge	required	for	the	future	development	of	the	primary	sector	in	Peninsular	
Malaysia	are	relevant	for	planning	development	in	East	Malaysia.	
As	a	geographical	unit,	Peninsular	Malaysia	is	more	advanced	than	East	Malaysia	in	social-
economic	development.	However,	there	are	areas	in	Peninsular	Malaysia	(e.g..	Kedah	and	
Kelantan)	where	infrastructural	facilities,	medical	services	and	human	resources	require	
upgrading.	In	this	respect,	then,	there	is	much	that	Peninsular	Malaysian	planners	have	
learned	about	regional	development	that	is	of	direct	relevance	to	Sabah	and	Sarawak.	The	
fact	that.	for	the	most	part,	the	ruling	parties	in	the	two	East	Malaysian	states	are	part	of	
the	National	Front	means	that	there	are	no	political	constraints	to	federal	funds	being	spent	
there.	This	is	very	different	from	the	situation	that	existed	in	Kelantan.	when	it	was	starved	
of	federal	development	projects	for	being	under	the	control	of	the	opposition	Pan	
Malaysian	Islamic	Party.	
The	influence	of	the	Peninsular	Malaysian	planning	style	is	seen	in	the	allocation	of	public	
development	expenditure	by	sector	in	Sabah	and	Sarawak	over	the	period	of	the	four	
Malaysian	plans,	1966-85.	Table	4	shows	that	over	this	period	the	ratios	of	economic	
expenditure	to	social	expenditure	for	Peninsular	Malaysia,	Sabah	and	Sarawak	were	4.0,	
4.25	and	4.2	respectively.	Thus	the	balance	in	Peninsular	Malaysia	between	economic	
expenditure	and	social	expenditure	has	been	adopted	for	the	East	Malaysian	states.	
Another	similarity	is	the	importance	given	to	agriculture	and	rural	development	and	energy	
and	public	utilities	in	the	economic	sector	and	the	importance	given	to	education	and	
training	in	the	social	sector.	There	are	differences,	the	most	significant	being	the	much	
greater	emphasis	placed	on	transport	in	East	Malaysia.	Development	expenditure	in	
administration	also	gets	a	bigger	share.	while	security	expenditure	assumes	much	greater	
significance	in	Peninsular	Malaysia.	
Another	similarity	is	the	importance	given	to	agricultural	and	rural	development	and	
	
The	similarities	in,	and	the	differences	between.	the	sectoral	allocations	of	development	
expenditure	in	East	and	Peninsular	Malaysia	are	consistent	with	the	similarities	in,	and	the	
differences	between,	their	economic	structures	and	stages	of	development.	The	sectoral	
allocations	for	Sabah	and	Sarawak	are	also	consistent	with	a	development	strategy	that	is	
based	on	the	development	of	natural	resources.	There	is,	first.	the	emphasis	on	agricultural	
and	rural	development	to	reflect	the	dominance	of	agriculture	in	the	East	Malaysian	
economy.	The	equally	large	expenditure	on	the	transport	sector	shows	recognition	of	the	
need	to	“free	up”	the	two	states	for	economic	development.	The	increasing	attention	to	the	
development	of	the	energy	and	utilities	sector	can	also	be	seen	in	this	light,	as	can	the	
emphasis	on	increasing	the	level	of	education.	training,	and	administrative	support.	The	
impression	given,	then.	is	of	a	public	sector	development	expenditure	strategy	that	is	
concerned	with	providing	the	supporting	infrastructural	and	manpower	services	to	enable	
the	vast	natural	resources	of	Sabah	and	Sarawak	to	be	developed	along	“vent	for	surplus"	
lines.11	Whatever	industrial	activities	encouraged	are	limited	to	those	which	enjoy	natural	
protection	or	those	which	make	intensive	use	of	locally	available	natural	resources.	The	
small	population	of	East	Malaysia	almost	guarantees	that	manufacturing	activities	outside	
these	two	areas	cannot	be	economically	viable.	
V.	Similarities	in	Pre-1963	Planning	in	East	and	Peninsular	Malaysia	
Some	form	of	development	planning	had	been	adopted	and	implemented	in	Sabah	and	
Sarawak	before	they	joined	the	Federation	of	Malaysia	in	1963.	The	philosophy	that	lay	
behind	this	planning	and	the	operation	and	procedures	used	were	quite	close	to	those	
adopted	by	planners	for	Peninsular	Malaysia	over	the	same	period.	The	level	of	
sophistication	was	lower	but	this	does	not	make	the	Peninsular	Malaysian	experience	
irrelevant	for	East	Malaysia,	nor	does	it	make	the	incorporation	of	the	two	state	
development	plans	into	the	various	Malaysia	Plans	difficult.	
The	first	pre-1963	plan	of	any	note	for	Sabah	(then	British	North	Borneo)	was	the	Plan	for	
Reconstruction	and	Development	for	1948-55.12	This	was	formulated	in	response	to	the	
passing	of	the	United	Kingdom	Colonial	Development	and	Welfare	Act	of	1945	which	
provided	£120m	for	development	and	welfare	schemes	in	British	colonies	over	the	period	
1945-56.	The	Draft	Development	Plan	of	1950-55	for	Peninsular	Malaysia	(then	Malaya)	was	
prepared	under	the	same	circumstances.	
The	main	aim	of	the	1948-55	plan	for	Sabah	was	to	rehabilitate	the	largely	war-	devastated	
economy.	A	total	expenditure	of	£6m	was	provided,	with	£2.2m	for	reconstruction	and	
£3.8m	for	development.	The	highest	priority	was	placed	on	infrastructural	activities,	which	
were	very	underdeveloped	even	before	the	Second	World	War.	Some	emphasis	was	also	
put	on	the	development	of	agriculture	and	livestock.	
The	next	plan	was	the	1959-64	Development	Plan.	It	was	originally	formulated	in	1958	and	
approved	in	1959.	with	a	development	expenditure	of	$60m,	to	be	funded	from	the	Colonial	
Development	and	Welfare	Fund	(43	per	cent),	loans	raised	by	the	Sabah	Government	(16	
per	cent).	and	surplus	funds	from	the	ordinary	budget	of	Sabah	(41	per	cent).	There	was	a	
contingency	fund	of	$10m.	The	largest	share	of	the	budget	of	$7lm	went	to	the	transport	
and	communications	sector	(43.7	per	cent).	Expenditures	on	public	buildings.	social	services	
and	public	utilities	were	also	significant.	The	total	expenditure	eventually	came	to	$l56m.	as	
revenues	were	boosted	by	the	buoyant	prices	for	timber.	
The	next	plan.	the	1965-70	Sabah	State	Development	Plan.	was	incorporated	into	the	First	
Malaysia	Plan.	1966-70.	However,	the	basic	philosophy	and	objectives	of	the	Sabah	Plan	
were	not	changed	significantly	as	a	result	of	this.	Four	long-term	development	goals	were	
identified.	These	were	the	promotion	of	economic	growth	as	fast	as	the	state's	human	
resources	would	permit.	the	rapid	development	of	the	state's	human	resources.	the	
widening	of	its	social	and	economic	facilities.	and	the	reduction	of	economic	and	social	
inequalities.	
The	specific	operational	objectives	of	the	1965-70	plan	were	to	promote	land	development,	
provide	universal	primary	education	by	1970.	construct	road	links	between	major	towns.	
extend	the	system	of	agricultural	feeder	roads.	upgrade	other	infrastructural	facilities.	
develop	the	communications	system,	expand	preventive	and	curative	medical	services.	and	
fill	the	extreme	shortages	of	skilled	and	semi-skilled	labour.	
The	1965-70	plan	was	thus	a	more	comprehensive	and	ambitious	effort	than	its	
predecessors	in	mobilising	the	state’s	human.	financial	and	natural	resources	to	achieve	
both	long-term	and	short-term	goals.	It	also	set	the	pattern	and	scope	for	the	subsequent	
development	plans	for	Sabah	which	were	incorporated	into	the	various	Malaysia	Plans.	
Pre-1963	development	plans	for	Sabah	were	no	more	than	aggregations	of	the	expansion	
programmes	of	separate	government	departments.	The	planning	procedure	was	simple.	
Each	government	department	was	requested	to	submit	its	own	bid	for	recurrent	and	
development	expenditure.	The	total	of	these	claims	would	normally	exceed	the	funds	
available.	and	a	committee	would	then	reduce	the	sum	total	of	these	claims	until	it	equalled	
that	of	the	funds	available.	The	exercise	would	be	carried	out	in	accordance	with	the	
government's	declared	priorities.	
The	plans	were	therefore	largely	programmes	of	public	investment	expenditure.	They	were	
not	comprehensive	development	plans	with	explicit	economic	targets	and	a	concern	for	
internal	consistency.	They	were	thus	essentially	the	same	as	the	Draft	Development	Plan	of	
Malaya.	1950-55.	and	the	First	Malaya	Plan.	1956-60.	As	such.	they	were	no	more	difficult	
to	incorporate	into	the	more	comprehensive	and	sophisticated	Malaysia	Plans	than	their	
Peninsular	Malaysian	counterparts.	The	1965-70	plan	was	an	advance	on	previous	Sabah	
plans.	and	its	presentation	and	approach	were	quite	consistent	with	those	of	the	Second	
Malaya	Plan,	1961-65.	
The	same	conclusions	can	be	made	about	planning	in	Sarawak.	As	in	the	case	of	Sabah.	a	
plan,	the	Development	and	Welfare	Plan	of	1947-56.	was	drawn	up	to	rehabilitate	and	
develop	an	economy	which	had	suffered	years	of	neglect	and	damage	because	of	the	
Second	World	War.	In	1951	a	revised	plan,	covering	the	period	1951-57.	was	prepared.	
partly	in	response	to	the	request	of	the	Consultative	Committee	of	the	Colombo	Plan	to	
British	colonies	to	draw	up	development	programmes	so	that	their	needs	for	foreign	aid	
could	be	assessed	and	partly	because	of	the	buoyant	export	earnings.	This	plan	was	
superseded	by	one	for	the	period	1955-60,	and	this,	in	turn,	was	followed	by	the	
Development	Plan	for	1959-63.	
As	with	the	early	plans	for	Peninsular	Malaysia	and	Sabah,	these	plans	for	Sarawak	were	
little	more	than	public	expenditure	programmes	aimed	at	infrastructural	development,	
especially	road	building,	and	the	development	of	the	subsistence	agricultural	sector.	Take,	
for	example.	the	case	of	the	1959-63	plan.	This	was	conceived	and	implemented	basically	as	
a	long-term	budget,	to	be	adjusted	according	to	the	availability	of	funds	and	the	progress	of	
the	projects	supported.	No	macroeconomic	targets	were	set,	so	the	plan	could	not	be	
assessed	by	comparing	the	actual	with	the	planned	growth	rates	of	the	state’s	output	and	
employment	levels.	Such	plans	are	typically	evaluated	by	comparing	the	actual	with	the	
planned	sectoral	expenditures.	Thus	for	the	I959-63	plan.	agricultural	performance	was	said	
to	have	been	disappointing	as	the	actual	share	of	agriculture	in	the	total	expenditure	was	
only	17	per	cent.	compared	to	the	target	of	27	per	cent.	Though	some	individual	agricultural	
projects	would	have	been	evaluated.	the	over-	all	approach	could	not	have	shown	the	
extent	to	which	agricultural	output	had	fallen	below	the	targetted	level	and	so	the	expected	
agricultural	contribution	to	Sarawak's	output	and	employment	growth.	
The	1964-68	Development	Plan	of	Sarawak	attempted	to	be	more	than	a	public	expenditure	
programme.	It	stated	that	“for	the	proper	planning	of	development	it	is	necessary	to	view	
the	economy	as	a	whole	and	to	decide	the	general	aims	which	it	is	hoped	to	achieve,	before	
one	maps	out	the	part	to	be	played	by	the	Government.	A	development	plan	should	result	
in	an	outline	of	the	government's	capital	expenditure	for	the	period	covered;	but	the	
government’s	investment	is	not	an	end	in	itself	and	it	is	the	total	results	of	the	economy	
which	matter	to	the	people	gaining	their	living	from	it".13	Thus	the	aim	of	planning	was	seen	
as	an	improvement	in	the	standard	of	living	of	the	people	and	this	was	set	in	terms	of	
output	and	employment	targets.	Government	expenditure	played	an	important	part	in	
achieving	these	targets	and	they	were	to	be	concentrated	on	infrastructural	development	
(especially	road	building).	agriculture	(especially	rubber	planting),	education.	and	public	
utilities	(especially	health	and	electricity).	The	1964-68	plan	could	therefore	be	assessed	in	
terms	of	macroeconomic	targets,	sectoral	allocation	targets.	and	project	efficiency,	and	was	
thus	a	more	comprehensive	plan	document	than	its	predecessors.	In	this	sense	it	compares	
relatively	well	with	the	1965—70	Sabah	Development	Plant	and	the	Second	Malaya	Plan	
1961-65.	and	was	incorporated	easily	into	the	First	Malaysia	Plan	1966-70.	
Vl.	Concluding	Remarks	
It	would	thus	be	fair	to	conclude	that	the	planning	experience	of	Peninsular	Malaysia	has	
been	relevant	for	Sabah	and	Sarawak.	and	that	the	East	Malaysian	plans	have	been	
incorporated	relatively	easily	into	the	various	Malaysia	Plans.	However,	this	does	not	mean	
that	the	development	strategy	adopted	for	East	Malaysia	has	no	weaknesses.	One	obvious	
weakness	lies	in	the	implementation	of	the	New	Economic	Policy	along	the	Peninsular	
Malaysian	lines.	All	of	the	criticisms	that	have	been	raised	against	the	restructuring	
programme	in	Peninsular	Malaysia	will	be	more	pointed	in	East	Malaysia,	given	the	
generally	lower	incomes	of	the	indigenous	people	and	the	smaller	number	of	skilled	
indigenous	civil	servants.	There	is	a	greater	tradition	of	“ministerial”	capitalism	in	East	
Malaysia,	especially	in	Sabah,	without	having	necessarily	the	efficiency	of	a	market	or	even	
“state”	capitalism.	The	restructuring	programme	of	the	New	Economic	Policy	has	
accentuated	this	tendency.	
Another	may	have	been	a	lack	of	awareness	of	the	effects	of	what	has	been	popularly	
known	as	the	“Dutch	disease",14	especially	in	the	case	of	Sabah.	Over	the	period	1945-75	
the	Dutch	economy	grew	rapidly,	largely	because	of	its	efficient	agricultural	export	sector.	
Large	reserves	of	natural	gas	were	found	in	the	early	1960s	and	gas	exports	became	
significant	after	1975.	This	resulted	in	a	massive	appreciation	of	the	Dutch	guilder	and	
marked	increases	in	government	spending.	The	former	led	to	a	loss	of	competitiveness	in	
traditional	Dutch	exports.	an	effect	which	was	compounded	by	the	rapid	increase	in	
inflation	rates	in	the	wake	of	the	increase	in	government	spending.	The	gas	windfall,	
therefore,	brought	mixed	blessings	to	the	Netherlands.	Hence	the	so-called	“Dutch	disease”,	
an	“illness”	that	is	suffered	by	the	oil-exporting	economies	of	Mexico,	Indonesia,	Venezuela	
and	Nigeria.	
In	the	1960s	and	early	1970s	the	Sabah	economy	benefited	from	the	export	of	timber,	and	
in	the	late	1970s	and	early	1980s	from	the	export	of	oil.	There	can	be	no	adverse	effect	
emanating	from	the	foreign	exchange	end	as	Sabah	is	a	part	of	Malaysia	and	does	not	run	
its	own	currency.	However,	inflationary	pressures	could	have	been	created,	not	only	
because	of	increased	government	spending	but	also	because	money	supply	increased	much	
faster	than	the	supply	of	goods	and	services.	No	research	has	been	carried	out	to	see	
whether	the	Sabah	economy	has	suffered	from	the	“Dutch	disease".	The	various	Malaysian	
plans	have	tended	to	treat	the	problem	of	primary	production	as	one	of	declining	terms	of	
trade	and	revenue	instability.	However,	it	is	possible	that	there	can	be	problems	of	plenty.		
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